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FURTHER WAFFLING ON DEDUCTING
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS
— by Neil E. Harl*
Although it was generally believed for many years that
environmental cleanup costs were currently deductible for
federal income tax purposes,1 the issuance of a series of
private letter rulings beginning in 1992 confirmed that the
Internal Revenue Service was convinced that INDOPCO,
Inc. v. Commissioner2 required that such expenditures be
capitalized and amortized over some time period.3
In 1994, IRS issued Rev. Rul. 94-384 which many
thought would resolve the contentious issue of deductibility
of cleanup costs.  That, however, proved not to be the case.
A 1995 technical advice memorandum5 confirmed that fact,
setting off more controversy.  Now, IRS has revoked the
1995 TAM,6 leaving some uncertainty as to the IRS
position.
The 1994 revenue ruling
In Rev. Rul. 94-38,7 IRS indicated that costs incurred to
clean up land contaminated by a business could be deducted
as ordinary and necessary business expenses.  In the facts of
the ruling, soil remediation activities included excavating
the contaminated soil, transporting the soil to a waste
disposal facility and backfilling with uncontaminated soil.
The ruling, in addition to allowing deductibility for soil
remediation expenses, held that costs attributable to
groundwater treatment facilities (wells, pipes, pumps and
other equipment to extract, treat and monitor groundwater)
were capital expenditures to be depreciated.8
IRS warned, informally, that Rev. Rul. 94-389 applied
only to situations where the taxpayer was responsible for
the pollution.
The 1995 TAM
The technical advice memorandum issued in 199510
confirmed that the informal IRS warning as to the scope of
Rev. Rul. 94-3811 should be taken seriously.  In the facts of
the 1995 ruling, a company had acquired  uncontaminated
farm land which was later used as a site for the disposal of
industrial waste.12  Later, a subsidiary of the firm acquiring
the land contributed the land to the county for a recreational
_____________________________________________________
*
 Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and
Professor of Economics, Iowa State University; member of the
Iowa Bar.
park and claimed a charitable deduction.13  Some time later,
the county discovered that the land was contaminated and
conveyed the land back to the subsidiary for $1.
Eventually, the state environmental agency designated
the land as a superfund site with remediation costs assessed
to the subsidiary.
IRS declared that Rev. Rul. 94-3814 did not apply
inasmuch as the taxpayer (the subsidiary) acquired
contaminated property.  The TAM explained that Rev. Rul.
94-3815 only applied if a taxpayer acquired clean property
and then contaminated the property through business
operations.
The policy implications from the TAM were somewhat
unusual if not perverse: a taxpayer acquiring clean property
who contaminates it is entitled to a deduction; those who
acquire contaminated property and clean it up are denied a
deduction.
The 1996 TAM
The latest IRS pronouncement, in the form of another
technical advice memorandum,16 revoked the 1995 TAM17
and allowed deductibility of consulting fees, legal expenses
and environmental impact study costs.  No actual work on
site remediation had been done.
The TAM reached that conclusion by holding that "the
interim break in ownership should not, in and of itself,
operate to disallow a deduction under the general principles
of section 162 of the Code."18 Thus, the subsidiary was
treated as though the land were still owned by the parent
company.  That is hardly earthshaking in light of (1) the
obviously close relationship between subsidiary and parent
and (2) the "purchase price" of $1 paid by the subsidiary to
reacquire the land from the county.
Conclusions
So where does all of this leave the issue of deductibility?
That is not entirely clear but some tentative conclusions can
be drawn -
•  A basic premise of Rev. Rul. 94-3819 that deductibility
is allowed if the taxpayer acquires clean land and
contaminates it seems to have survived the TAMs.
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•  Those acquiring contaminated land and wanting to (or
forced to) clean it up apparently must capitalize remediation
costs.
•  Transfers of ownership in less than arm's length
transactions, particularly where the consideration is
nominal, are unlikely to affect deductibility.
FOOTNOTES
1 I.R.C. § 162(a).
2 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1043 (1992).
3 Ltr. Rul. 9240004, June 29, 1992; Ltr. Rul. 9315004,
Dec. 17, 1992; Ltr. Rul. 9411002, Nov. 19, 1993.  See
generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 28.05[21][d]
(1996). See also Harl, "Environmental Cleanup Costs," 4
Agric. L. Dig. 117 (1993); Harl, "Handling
Environmental Cleanup Costs," 5 Agric. L. Dig. 113
(1994).
4 1994-1 C.B. 35.
5 Ltr. Rul. 9541005, Sept. 27, 1995.
6 Ltr. Rul. 9627002, Jan. 17, 1996.
7 1994-1 C.B. 35.
8 Id.
9 1994-1 C.B. 35.
10 Ltr. Rul. 9541005, Sept. 27, 1995.
11 1994-1 C.B. 35.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 1994-1 C.B. 35.
15 Id.
16 Ltr. Rul. 9627002, Jan. 17, 1996.
17 Ltr. Rul. 9541005, Sept. 27, 1995.
18 Id.
19 1994-1 C.B. 35.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
CLAIMS. The debtor had granted to a lender a security
interest in a tractor truck used in the debtor’s business. The
debtor filed for Chapter 13 and the plan provided for the
debtor’s retention of the truck for use in the business and for
payment of the loan secured by the truck in the amount
equal to the wholesale value of the truck on the date of the
petition, using the cramdown provision of Section
1325(a)(5)(B). The lender argued that, under Section 506(a),
the secured amount of the claim was equal to the
replacement value of the truck at its full retail value. The
debtor presented credible expert testimony as to the
wholesale value of the truck and the lender provided weak
expert testimony as to the retail value of the truck. The
Court held that the amount of the secured portion of the
claim was limited to the wholesale value of the truck as
determined by the debtor’s expert testimony. Matter of
Rash, 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The IRS filed a claim for unpaid
income taxes, penalties and interest and unpaid employment
taxes, penalties and interest. Prior to the filing for
bankruptcy, the IRS had filed a notice of levy against the
debtors’ real property which was subject to an Illinois land
trust. The notice was not filed with the trustee. After the
bankruptcy filing, the IRS erroneously filed a duplicate
notice of levy and sent the debtors a notice of audit of
employment taxes for pre-bankruptcy tax years. The IRS
later rescinded the duplicate notice of levy. The debtors first
argued that the duplicate levy notice and audit notice
violated the automatic stay, but the court held that the
rescission of the duplicate notice removed any violation and
that an audit notice was not a violation of the automatic
stay. The debtors also argued that the rescission of the
duplicate notice caused the initial levy to be rescinded
because the second notice merged with the first. The court
held that this argument failed because the debtors failed to
provide any support for the merger theory in statute or case
law. The debtors also argued that the assessed penalties and
interest should have been abated because the debtors’ failure
to pay the taxes resulted from the high medical bills for their
disabled child. The court held that the debtors had sufficient
means to either pay the taxes from income or by borrowing
the money against their substantial equity in the debtors’
home. Carlson v. U.S., 198 B.R. 949 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
DISCHARGE. The IRS filed a claim for 1986, 1987
and 1988 taxes owed by the debtors. The taxes were due
more than three years before the bankruptcy petition was
filed. The 1986 and 1987 taxes were assessed more than 240
days before the petition but the 1988 taxes were assessed
151 days before the petition. The debtors received a
discharge in the case but, after the discharge, the IRS
continued to seek payment of the taxes through levies, even
after letters from the debtors were sent reminding the IRS of
the discharge. The IRS argued that the three year period
should have been equitably waived by the court but did not
provide any reason for the equitable waiver. The court held
that the IRS’s failure to seek the equitable waiver before
violating the automatic stay of the discharge prohibited
applying equitable principles to the IRS’s claims. Therefore,
the court ruled that the IRS could continue assessments and
collection only as to the 1988 taxes which were not
discharged. In re Gilmore, 198 B.R. 686 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 1996).
DISMISSAL. The debtor filed for Chapter 11 with
primarily federal income tax debts as claims in the case. The
court found that the debtor failed to file the Chapter 11
operating reports in contravention of court orders, filed
incorrect and misleading information with the court, and
failed to file and pay post-petition income taxes. The court
held that the debtor’s actions demonstrated bad faith
sufficient to warrant dismissal of the case. Matter of
Whitehurst, 198 B.R. 981 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).
